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CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD
PERSONS'
ARTHUR L. CORBIN
Professor of Law, Yale University
By the great weight of authority in the United States the same facts
that operate to create contractual relations between the offeror and
the acceptor may also operate to create rights in a third person. 2 It
may be useful, therefore, to examine in detail the nature and limits
of this doctrine and to classify and discuss the cases in distinct
groups.
To many students and practitioners of the common law privity of
contract3 became a fetish. As such, it operated to deprive many a
claimant of a remedy in cases where according to the mores of the
time the claim was just. It has made many learned men believe that
a chose in action could not be assigned. Even now, it is gravely
asserted that a man cannot be made the debtor of another against his
will. But the common law was gradually influenced by equity and
by the law merchant, so that by assignment a debtor could become
bound to pay a perfect stranger to himself, although until the legisla-
ture stepped in, the common-law courts characteristically made use of
a fiction and pretended that they were not doing that which they
really were doing.
TRUST BENEFICIARIES
If without privity of contract, one may become indebted to another,
the lack of privity is surely no reason for denying him a beneficial
right. As usual, equity saw this long before the common law did.'
This article contains the substance of certain sections in an edition of Anson
on Contracts to be published by the Oxford University Press. Some use has
been made of the notes of Professor E. W. Huffcut in an earlier edition.
2 See 13 C. J. 7o5, sec. 815, citing more than 350 cases; 6 R. C. L 884, sec. 271;
Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's ed. i9o6) 237-278.
'In order that privity of contract may exist, it seems to be necessary for A
to say to B "I promise you." It requires the voluntary selection of each party
by the other. See criticism of the term privity in i5 Am. LAw Rnv. 244-5. For
recent adherence to the fetish, see 6 R. C. L. 885, sec. 271.
'Not alone in the cases of trustee and cestui que trust was this true. The
court did not shrink from expanding the concept of a trust to cover the case
of a contract beneficiary. See Tomlinson v. Gill (756) Ambler, 33o, before
Hardwicke, L C.; Moore v. Darton (1851) 4 DeG. & Sm. 517. See also School
District v. Livers (1899) 147 Mo. 58o; Forbes v. Thorpe (ig91) 2o9 Mass. 570;
Grime v. Borden (1896) x66 Mass. i98; Nash v. Commonwealth (1899) 174
Mass. 335.
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No privity is necessary to create rights in a cestui que trust, and no
consideration need move from him. If it was possible and desirable
for equity to recognize the very extensive rights, powers, privileges,
and immunities of a cestui que trust, it is equally possible, and it
appears to the American courts to be equally desirable, to recognize
similar relations betwen a promisor and a contractual beneficiary. It
is no answer to say that in the one case the magic words "in trust"
were used, while in the latter they were not. This would be mere
fetish worship once more. It may be that the rights, powers,
privileges, and immunities of a cestui que trust are more numerous
and valuable than are those of a contract beneficiary. The cestui que
trust, without privity and without giving value, gets so much;-
should not the contract beneficiary be given at least a crumb ?5
It may be argued that in the case of trust there is a specific res,
while in the case of the contract there is not. This is also a dis-
tinction that proves nothing. Suppose there is a specific physical
res-its mere existence is no reason for creating rights in a benefi-
ciary without privity and without value given by him. In many cases
of trust, however, there is no physical res. The trust res is then said
to consist of the rights and powers of the trustee, which he "holds"
in trust and must exercise for the benefit of the cestui que trust. If
such an unreal res may be the basis of rights in a beneficiary, there
is no greater difficulty in the case of contract.
The reasons for recognizing rights in the contract beneficiary are
substaritially the same as those underlying the rights of a cestui que
trust. By so doing the intention of the parties is carried out and the
beneficiary's just expectations are fulfilled. The reason is not, as
has sometimes been suggested, that the promisee was acting as the
agent of the third party.' He was not in fact so acting and nobody
supposed that he was. Nor is the beneficiary's right to be explained
on some theory of subrogation.7
POSSESSION OF ASSETS BY THE PROMISOR
In nearly all of the American jurisdictions, including those that
deny a right of action to most third party beneficiaries, there is one
sort of beneficiary who is given a right of action. "Where, under a
'See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City R. Co. (1912) i98 Fed. 721,
749. Lord Mansfield in Martyn v. Hind (1776) Cowp. 437, 443, said it was a
matter of surprise how a doubt could have arisen in a case like Dutton v. Poole
(1677) 2 Lev. 210.
'See opinion of Johnson, C. J., and Denio, J., in Lawrence v. Fox (859) 20
N. Y. 268; Union Inst. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (i9o7) 196 Mass. 23o. In accord
with the text is the opinion of Finch J., in Gifford v. Corrigan (1889) 117 N. Y.
257.
' See discussion below in connection with mortgagee-beneficiaries.
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contract between two persons, assets have come to the promisor's
hands or under his control which in equity belong to a third person,"
the beneficiary can maintain an action at law in his own name.8
These cases essentially recognize that a beneficiary can acquire a
legal right without privity and without giving consideration. In
some such cases a true equitable trust may exist with respect to some
specific res. In most such cases, however, this is not so. If there is
a trust and a specific res, the duty of the promisor should be
held to be merely the duty to account. The fact is that the duty
enforced against the promisor is that of a debtor." Some of these
cases may properly be regarded as based upon the quasi-contractual
doctrine of unjust enrichment, in which case the defendant's duty is
limited by the value received by him. By the great majority of courts,
however, it is regarded as unjust for the promisor not to perform as
he promised in return for a consideration; and the beneficiary's
right is dependent upon neither a specific res nor an unjust enrich-
ment, but upon the existence of a valid contract.10
PLAINTIFF A PROMISEE, BUT CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY ANOTHER
In some cases the promise is made to the plaintiff, but the consid-
eration moves from.a third party. Here the plaintiff is a promisee
and there is no lack of privily. The problem is merely one as to con-
'See National Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878) 98 U. S. 123; Hall v. Marston
(1822) I7 Mass. 575; Fitch v. Chandler (1849, Mass.) 4 Cush. 254; Mellen v.
Whipple (1854, Mass.) I Gray, 317; Exchange Bank v. Rice (1871) IO7 Mass.
37. And see cases cited in 13 C. J. 704, secs. 8og, 8io. A recent Massachusetts
case says that the plaintiff's right is "in equity"; but this does not affect the
character of the right and the duty, for the defendant is treated as a debtor and
not as -a trustee. Forbes v. Thorpe (I9II) 209 Mass. 57o. Cf. Borden v. Board-
man (1892) 157 Mass. 41o. A remedy at law was denied in Morgan v. Randolph
& Clowes Co. (igoo) 73 Conn. 396.
The "assets" here referred to are assets in the hands of the promisor and do
not include the promise itself, which is sometimes regarded as an asset of the
promisee.
'For example, where a devise given on condition that a certain sum be paid
to a beneficiary is accepted by the devisee, the latter is a debtor of the beneficiary
irrespective of the value of the devise. Felch v. Taylor (I832, Mass.) 13 Pick.
133; Adams v. Adams (1867, Mass.) 14 Allen, 65; Olmstead v. Brush (1858)
27 Conn. 530; Brown v. Knapp (1879) 79 N. Y. 136; Flickinger v. Saum (1884)
40 Oh. St 591; Porter v. Jackson (1884) 95 Ind. 210; LaValle v. Droit (1913)
179 Ill. App. 484; Etter v. Greenawalt (1881) 98 Pa. 422. See.also Feldman v.
McGuire (1899) 34 Ore. 309.
The plaintiff's action, therefore, may be assumpsit for unliquidated damages
as well as debt for a specific sum. His action lies also where the defendant has
assumed to settle a claim for unliquidated damages that the plaintiff had against
the promisee. Likewise the beneficiary has been given an injunction for the
enforcement of a negative covenant Ferris v. Amer. Brewing Co. (igoo) 155
Ind. 539.
1ioO
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
sideration. It is the English law that the consideration must move
from the promisee. 1 Such is not the American law as. generally laid
down by our courts 1 2 and some of the cases draw a clear dis-
tinction between a promise to the plaintiff upon a consideration mov-
ing from another13 and a promise to X for the benefit of the plaintiff
upon a consideration moving from X. In some cases the promise
seems to be made simultaneously to both the plaintiff and the one
furnishing the consideration. 4 Where a promise is made to two
persons jointly, it seems not to be questioned whether the considera-
tion must move from both. No doubt a fiction is indulged and the
joint promisees are regarded as a unity. Where the beneficiary is.
not himself the promisee, he can always establish a sufficient "privity"
to satisfy the courts by obtaining an assignment from the promisee.
He will then possess whatever rights the promisee had as well as such
rights as a beneficiary as may be recognized in the particular jurisdic-
tion.u
DONEE-BENEFICIARIES AND SOLE BENEFICIARIES
In many cases the purpose of the promisee in securing a promise
for the benefit of a third party is to confer a gratuitous benefit upon
that third party. In such cases this third party will usually be the
only person who will be benefited by the promised performance; he
will be the sole beneficiary.' Performance will not benefit the
promisee; he is not to receive it, and such performance will not dis-
charge any duty of the promisee, for he owes none to the beneficiary.
If the purpose is to discharge some duty owed by the promisee to the
third party, the latter is not a donee.
-Dunlop v. Selfridge [i915] A. C. 847.
1 Van Eman v. Stanchfield (1879) io Minn. 255; Rector v. Teed (i8go) 12o
N. Y. 583; Palmer Sav. Bk. v. Insurance Co. (1896) 166 Mass. i89. See also
Gardner v. Denison (1914) 217 Mass. 492.
" In First N. B. vL. Chalmers (i895) i44 N. Y. 432, 439, the court says:
"I do not deem the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (i859) 20 N. Y. 268 involved
in this controversy. That doctrine applies where no express promise has been
made to the party suing, but he claims the right to rest upon a promise between
other parties having respect to the debt due to him and as having been made
for his benefit It struggles to obviate a lack of privity upon equitable principles,
but is needless and has no proper application where the privity exists, and a
direct promise has been made upon which the action may rest."
See also De Cicco v. Schweizer (917, N. Y.) ii7 N. E. 807, and the dissenting
opinion of Comstock, J., in Lawrence v. Fox (I859) 2o N. Y. 268.
"Bouton v. Welch (I902) 17o N. Y. 554; Furbish v,. Goodnow (1867) 98
Mass. 296.
"Hyland v. .Crofut (I913) 87 Conn. 49; Reed v. Paul (188) 131 Mass. 129;
Litchfield v. Flint (1887) 1o4 N. Y. 543; Societa Italiana v. Sulzer (1893) 138
N. Y. 468.
'The plaintiff may be a donee-beneficiary even though he is not the sole
beneficiary. In such case he can maintain suit Jenkins v. Chesapeake & 0. R.
Co. (19o7) 61 W. Va. 597.
IOII
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It is clear that a sole beneficiary should be allowed to enforce the
contract, and great numbers of cases have so held.1 7  It was once
suggested by the United States Supreme Court 18 that a sole beneficiary
was the only kind who could sue, on the ground that to allow a
creditor-beneficiary to sue would subject the promisor to two suits
for breach.' 9 On the other hand, the New York courts long repeated
the rule that no beneficiary could sue unless he was a creditor (or an
obligee) of the promisee.2' Neither of these limitations, contradic-
tory to each other as they are, should be sustained.
Some cases have decided in favor of a donee-beneficiary on the
ground of a relationship by blood or marriage between the beneficiary
and the promisee.1 Such relationship is an evidential fact showing
'In re Edmundson's Estate (19i8, Pa.) io3 AtI. 277; Rogers v. Galloway
Female College (1898) 64 Ark. 627 (beneficiary of a charitable subscription) ;
St. Louis v. Von Phul (1895) i33 Mo. 56I; Todd v. Weber (1884) 95 N. Y. I81
(promise to the mother of plaintiff to furnish support. See other cases of this
type in note 21 infra); Whitehead v. Burgess (1897) 61 N. J. L. 75; Bouton
v. Welch (192) 170 N. Y. 554; Pond v. New Rochelle W. Co. (19o6) 183 N. Y.
330 (promise to a village for the benefit of the inhabitants); Rigney v. New
York Central R. R. Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 31 (same); Smyth v. New York
(1911) 2o3 N. Y. io6 (same); Independent Sch. Dist. v. Le Mars Water Co.
(19o6) 131 Iowa, 14; Doll v. Crume (1894) 41 Neb. 655; Gorrell v. Water Co.
(1899) 124 N. C. 328; Tweeddale v. Tweeddale (19o3) 116 Wis. 517; Simons v.
Bedell (1898) 122 Cal. 341 (specific performance decreed). Contra, Knights of
the Maccabees v. Sharp (igio) 163 Mich. 449. See further 22 L. R. A. (N. S.)
492; 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151; 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1166.
"National Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878) 98 U. S. 123. By statute, this rule
seems to prevail in the Virginias. Newberry Land Co. v. Newberry (1897) 95
Va. iig; King v. Scott (915) 76 W. Va. 58.
"The rights of the promisee will be discussed below.
King v. Whitely (1843, N. Y.) io Paige, 465 [but see Thorp v. Keokuk &
Co. (x872) 48 N. Y. 253]; Vrooman v. Turner (x877) 69 N. Y. 28o; Durnherr
v. Rau (1892) 135 N. Y. 219; Jefferson v. Asch (1893) 53 Minn. 446. Their
substantial abandonment of this doctrine will be indicated below. Nevertheless
the doctrine continues to influence the decisions in many states in certain classes
of cases. See the sections below on "Mortgagee-beneficiaries" and "Liability
of Water Companies."
'Dutton v. Poole (I677) 2 Lev. 21o; In re Edmundson's Estate (1918, Pa.)
1o3 At. 277; Daily v. Minnick (902) 117 Iowa, 563; Benge v. Hiatt (1885)
82 Ky. 666; Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden (i8o6, N. Y.) i Johns, 139; Todd
v. Weber, supra; Coleman v. Whitney (1889) 62 Vt 123. Contra, Linneman v.
Morass (1893) 98 Mich. 178.
In the following cases, it is believed, the relationship by blood or marriage
caused the court to strain the facts and to hold, contrary to the fact, that the
beneficiary was also a promisee: DeCicco v. Schweizer (i97, N. Y.) 117 N. E.
8o7; Gardner v. Denison (1914) 217 Mass. 492; Eaton v. Libbey (1896) 165
Mass. 218; Freeman v. Morris (1907) 131 Wis. 216. In the following cases
such relationship caused the court to hold that the promisee owed the bene-
ficiary a legal or an equitable duty when in fact there was none: Buchanan v.
Tilden (1899) 158 N. Y. iog; Seaver v. Ransom (i917, App. Div.) 168 N. Y.
Supp. .4. Cf. Opper v. Hirsh (i9Oi) 68 N. Y. Supp. 879. *
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1013CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
that the promisee truly intended that the third party should receive
a benefit, and indicates the causa-the reason or motive-for which
he paid the consideration. But the intention to benefit the third party
can be dearly shown by the express words of the contract, or by
other evidence, and relationship should not be held to be a necessary
operative fact.
22
In life insurance the beneficiary is usually a sole beneficiary, and in
all jurisdictions he can maintain suit on the policy. In England and
a few of our states, this result was attained by statute.
23 It would
indeed create a scandal to deny him a right of action either because
he was not the promisee or because he gave no consideration.
CREDITOR-BENEFICLARES
Where the third party is a creditor of the promisee, or has a right
against him for some particular performance, the purpose with which
the promisee contracts with the promisor may be to induce the latter
to pay the debt or otherwise to discharge the third party's claim. In
such case, performance will directly benefit both the third party (the
creditor or claimant) and the promisee. The third party is not a
donee and is not a sole beneficiary. Although not the first case of the
sort, the famous case of Lawrence v. Fox
2 4 is now regarded as the
leading authority to the effect that a creditor-beneficiary has an
enforceable right. Here a money debt of $300 was owed by Holly
to Lawrence, and he had that sum ready to be paid. Fox borrowed
the money over night, promising Holly to pay the debt to Lawrence
next day. It was held that Lawrence could maintain suit against
Fox to enforce this promise. For a good many years this decision was
severely criticised, the critics being obsessed with the idea that privity
was logically necessary. Fine distinctions were often drawn so as to
avoid following this decision, but in spite of some confusion thus
caused, the great weight of authority is in harmony with it and a
creditor-beneficiary can maintain suit
2 5
' It now seems to be assumed to be the settled law of England that blood
relationship will not enable a beneficiary to sue. Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861)
i B. & S. 393.
' In Massachusetts the beneficiary's right has been saick to be in equity only.
Nires v. Ford (1893) i59 Mass. 575. It is not apparent on casual inspection
why the procedural statute, R. L. i9o2, C. 159, sec. 8, should not sustain an
action of "contract."
"' (1859) 2o N. Y. 268.
'Bohanan v. Pope (i856) 42 Me. 93; Joslin v. New Jersey'Car Spring Co.
(1873) 36 N. J. L. i4i; Barker v'. Bucklin (1846, N. Y.) 2 Den. 45; Wood v.
Moriarty (887) i5 R. I. 5i8; ZeIrs Appeal (1886) iI1 Pa. 532, 547; Ballard v.
Home Nat'l. Bank (1913) gi Kan. 9i, L. R. A. i9r6 C, I61, and note. See 25
L. R. A. 257, note; 13 C. J. 705, sec. 815, citing hundreds of cases.
Where a new partner enters a firm and promises the old members to pay a
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that the promisee truly intended that the third party should receive
a benefit, and indicates the causa-the reason or motive--for which
he paid the consideration. But the intention to benefit the third party
can be clearly shown by the express words of the contract, or by
other evidence, and relationship should not be held to be a nece sary
operative fact. 2
In life insurance the beneficiary is usually a sole beneficiary, and in
all jurisdictions he can maintain suit on the policy. In England and
a few of our states, this result was attained by statute.23 It would
indeed create a scandal to deny him a right of action either because
he was not the promisee or because he gave no consideration.
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One of the most frequent cases where a third party attempts to
enforce a contract on the theory that he is a beneficiary is that of a
mortgagee. A mortgagee is nearly always to be regarded as the
creditor of somebody, but he may not be the creditor of the promisee.
Where a mortgagor who is himself personally indebted sells his
interest in the property mortgaged to a grantee who assumes payment
of the mortgage debt, the mortgagee is a creditor-beneficiary, and he
is almost universally allowed to maintain suit against the grantee and
to get a personal judgment against him for the amount of the debt.2 6
share of the previous debts he may properly be sued by the creditors. Arnold v.
Nichols (876) 64 N. Y. 117; Lehow v. Simonton (1877) 3 Colo. 346; Dunlap
v. McNeil (1871) 35 Ind. 3x6; Floyd v. Ort (1878) 20 Kan. z62; Hannigan v.
Allen (18gi) 127 N. Y. 639; Claflin v. Ostrom (1874) 54 N. Y. 581; Maxfield
v. Schwartz (189o) 43 Minn. 21; f3 C. J. 709. It was once held that a promise
to pay one-half or some other fraction of all the previous debts cannot be
enforced by any creditor because no single creditor can well show that it is for
his benefit. Wheat v. Rice (1884) 97 N. Y. 296; Serviss v. McDonnell (1887)
107 N. Y. 26o; distinguished in Hannigan.v. Allen, supra. Contra: Johnson
v. McClung (1885) 26 W. Va. 659.
Where a mortgagor insures premises and the policy is made payable to the
mortgagee as his interest may appear, the mortgagee can sue the insurer.
Union Inst. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (19o7) 196 Mass. 230 (on theory of agency);
Palmer Savings Bank v. Ins. Co. (I896) 166 Mass. I89. Contra: Minnock v.
Eureka F. & M. L Co. (1892) go Mich. 236.
Where a municipality owes a duty to travellers to keep a street in repair
and makes a contract with the defendant for the latter to do this, a traveller
who is injured can sue the defendant by virtue of this contract, Jenree v.
Metrop. St. Ry. Co. (1912) 86 Kan. 479; McMahon v. Second Ave. R. Co.
(1878) 75 N. Y. 231. See many other cases of this sort cited in 49 L. R. A.
(N. S.) x166, note.
See further, mortgagee-beneficiary cases, infra.
A very few states still hold that a creditor-beneficiary cannot sue in a com-
mon law action. Morgan v. Randolph & Clowes Co. (igoo) 73 Conn. 396;
Mellen v. Whipple (1854, Mass.) i Gray 317; Exchange Bank v. Rice (287i)
1o7 Mass. 37; Borden v. Boardman (1892) 157 Mass. 41o; Minnock v. Eureka
F. & M. L Co. (1892) go Mich. 236; Edwards v. Thoman (1915) 187 Mich.
361; National Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878) 98 U. S. 123.
-W Gifford v. Corrigan (x889) 117 N. Y. 257; Thorp v. Keokuk Coal.Co. (1872)
48 N. Y. 253, 257; Burr v. Beers (i86i4 24 N. Y. 178; Gay v. Blanchard (x88o)
32 La. Ann. 497;'Pope v. Porter (1887) 33 Fed. 7; Urquhart v. Brayton (1878)
12 R. I. i6g; Carver v. Eads (288o) 65 Ala. 29o; Allen v. Bucknam (1883) 75
Me 352; Figart v. Halderman (188i) 75 Ind. 567; Huyler v. Atwood (1875)
26 N. J. Eq. 504; George v. Andrews (1882) 6o Md. 26; Cooper v. Foss (1884)
15 Neb. 515. Contra in the Virginias, where by statute only a sole beneficiary
can sue: Newberry Land Co. v. Newberry (1897) 95 Va. iig; King v. Scott
(1915) 76 W. Va. 58.
See, further, cases cited in 13 C. J. 707, sec. 816. In Michigan and Connecticut
a mortgagee-beneficiary can sue by virtue of a special statute. Mich. Comp.
Laws I897, sec. 5i9; Corning v. Burton (1894) 2O2 Mich. 86; Conn. G. S. 2902,
sec. 587.
1ox4
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
Suppose, however, that the mortgagor sells his interest to a grantee
who buys subject to the mortgage but who makes no promise what-
ever to pay the mortgage debt. He does not "assume the mortgage
debt." In such a case, the grantee's rights in rem are limited by the
mortgage,27 but he undertakes no duty to pay the debt. The
mortgagee, therefore, can maintain no action against him, and neither
can the grantor. Such a grantee, however, has in numerous cases
sold his interest to a second grantee and has caused the latter to
assume payment of the mortgage debt. There is here an express
promise the performance of which requires a payment directly to the
mortgagee. The first grantee is the promisee, and he will not be
benefited at all by the payment. So far as the promisee is con-
cerned, therefore, the mortgagee seems to be a mere donee-beneficiary
and the sole beneficiary. At this point the decisions are found to be
hopelessly at variance. 28 Those holding that the mortgagee can sue
the promisor in these cases seem to be more nearly consistent with the
weight of authority in other beneficiary cases. Those holding
the contrary generally do so on the ground that a third party can-
not enforce a contract unless the performance will operate not only
as a benefit to him, but also as the fulfillment of a legal or an equitable
duty owing by the promisee to him. This rule was laid down during
the period when many of the courts desired to limit the application
of the rule of Lawrence v. Fox.29  It denies all donee-beneficiaries
a remedy, and is being abandoned. 30
Some of the cases denying the mortgagee a remedy under these
circumstances rest upon the theory that a beneficiary's right is based
upon the equitable doctrine of subrogation. It is generally held in
equity that a creditor is not only entitled to sue his principal debtor
and all collateral sureties and to realize on such securities as may
have been charged with the debt, but also to make use of all securities
'The grantee lacks many rights and immunities because of the mortgage;
he has certain "no-rights" because the mortgagee has privileges, and he has
liabilities because the mortgagee has powers.
The mortgagee can sue: McDonald v. Finseth (i915) 32 N. D. 40o; Cassel-
man v. Gordon (I916) ii8 Va. 553; Llewellyn v. Butler (i915) 186 Mo. 525;
Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., supra. Dean v. Walker (1883) io7 IlL 54o; Marble
Sav. Bank v. Mesarvey (897) ioi Iowa, 285; Crone v. Stinde (igoo) 156 Mo.
262; Hare v. Murphy (1895) 45 Neb. 8og; McKay v. Ward (1899) 20 Utah,
149; also many other cases in accord, cited, in Fry v. Ausman, infra.
Contra: Fry v. Ausman (2922) 29 S. D. 30; 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 15o, citing
many other cases; Vrooman v. Turner (1877) 69 N. Y. 28o; Ward v. DeOca
(I8g8) 120 Cal. i02. See note in 22 .1. A. (N. S.) 492
'Jefferson v. Asch (1893) 53 Minn. 446; Viooman v. Turner (1877) 69 N. Y.
28o; Durnherr v. Rau (1892),135 N. Y. 229.
' See discussion of donee-beneficiaries, ante; also post, "New York Law."
Modern decisions are: Buchanan v. Tilden (i899) 258 N. Y. io9; Pond v.
New Rochelle Water Co. (i9o6) 183 N. Y. 330; De Cicco v. Schweizer (29i7,
N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7; Gardner v. Denison (i914) 217 Mass. 492.
.1o15
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that the principal debtor may have given to the surety for the
indemnity of the latter.31 It is also held that where one assumes the
debt of another, although the latter is not thereby discharged, he
occupies thereafter the position of a surety and the new promisor
occupies the position of a principal debtor. Thus where the promisee
is himself indebted to the mortgagee, but has become, under the above
theory, a mere surety by reason of his contract with the new promisor,
the courts may resort to the doctrine of subrogation and sustain an
action by the mortgagee against the promisor because the promisee
could have maintained such an action. On the other hand, if the
promisee is not himself bound to pay the debt, he is not a surety and
the doctrine of subrogation is not applicable.
It appears, however, that this is a very doubtful ground upon which
to sustain the action of the mortgagee (or other beneficiary) against
the promisor. The doctrine of subrogation has no doubt been very
beneficial in spite of fiction and artificiality; but in this instance it
has been used to confer new security and new rights upon a creditor,
as a gift out of a clear sky. In suretyship it is used only as against
one who is already legally indebted in order to secure the fulfillment
of that legal duty. A doctrine whose purpose was the enforcement of
a previously recognized duty cannot properly be given as the sole
reason for creating an entirely new duty.32
To rest the beneficiary's right to recover on such a theory as this
would shut out all donee (or non-creditor) beneficiaries altogether,
yet they are the very persons once thought by the Supreme Court of
the United States to be the only beneficiaries who should be permitted
to sue on a promise made to another person.33 Included among such
beneficiaries are most of the persons for whose benefit life insurance
policies are issued.
The mortgagee's right against the promisor should rest on the same
ground as the right of other beneficiaries. The promisor has under-
"Brandt, Suretyship (3d ed.) sec. 357; Sheldon, Subrogation, (2d ed.) sec.
154; Spencer, Suretyship, sec. i8i; Ames, Cases on Suretyship, 62o and note;
Keller v. Ashford (i89o) 133 U. S. 6io; Hopkins v. Warner (i8g5) iog Cal.
133.
'The extension of the subrogation theory to cover this case, where the
promisor was not indebted to the third party by reason of any operative fact
other than his promise to the promisee, is merely a cumbrous intellectual expedi-
ent for holding that a contract between two parties can create an enforceable
right in a third. E. g. see Keller v. Ashford (i889) 133 U. S. 6io, 623.
See Nat'l Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878) 98 U. S. 123.
The Virginia court regards the fact that the promisee was not bound to pay
the debt as showing that the mortgagee was necessarily the "sole beneficiary"
within the meaning of the Va. Code, sec. 2415, giving such a beneficiary a
remedy. Casselman v. Gordon (igi6) II8 Va. 553. See also Merriman v.
Moore (1879) 9o Pa. 78; Davis v. Davis (1912) ig Cal. App. 797. Under such
a statute it was held that the mortgagee could not sue the grantee of one who
was himself personally indebted. King v. Scott (I915) 76 W. Va. 58.
zo16
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
taken for a sufficient consideration to perform an act that will be
beneficial to the third party. If such benefit was the contemplated
result, and if judgment and execution in favor of the third party
will give effect to the intention of the promisor and of the party
giving the consideration, there is ample justification for sustaining
action by the beneficiary.
Some of the cases denying the mortgagee a remedy may perhaps
be justified for the reason that the contracting parties had no inten-
tion of benefiting the mortgagee or of conferring a right of action
upon him. Indeed, some of them are placed squarely on this ground.
3
But it is believed that where the promisor has received consideration
for a promise the fulfillment of which necessarily requires him to pay
money directly to a mortgagee or other third person, it would seem
not unreasonable to draw an invariable inference that such third
person was contemplated as a beneficiary and as the holder of a new
and additional right of action.
INCIDENTAL AND UNINTENDED BENEFICIARIES
These are persons not intended by the contracting parties to have
new rights, and not named as beneficiaries or even as the persons
to whom payment is to be made or other performance given. In
order that a third party may sue upon a contract made by others he
must show that he was intended by them to have an enforceable
right or at least that the performance of the contract must necessarily
be of benefit to him and such benefit must have been within the con-
templation and purpose of the contracting parties.3 5 He has no right
of action where he incidentally finds a provision in some contract
which makes to his advantage. On this ground a remedy has, in some
instances, been refused to a material man suing on a builder's bond
conditioned on paying all claims for material,38 and likewise to a
See Fry v. Ausman (92) 29 S. D. 30; King v. Scott (x15) 76 W. Va. 58.
'Durnherr v. Rau (1892) 135 N. Y. 219; Wheat v. Rice (1884) 97 N. Y. 296;
Campbell v. Lacock (1861) 40 Pa. 448; Adams v. Kuehn (I888) iig Pa. 76;
Miller v. Winchell (I877) 7o N. Y. 437; Case v. Case (19I1) 2o3 N. Y. 263;
Lockwood v. Smith (913) 143 N. Y. Supp. 48o; Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Prather
(1898) 65 Ark. 27; Buckley v. Gray (895) ii0 Cal. 339. In New Orleans St.
J. Assn. v. Magnier (1861) 16 La. Ann. 338, the plaintiff was denied a remedy
because performance of the defendant's primary contractual duty would not
have benefited the plaintiff, although the plaintiff was expressly named as bene-
ficiary of a penalty clause. This decision should not be followed. See further
13 C. J. 709.
' Standard Gas Power Corp. v. New England Casualty Co. (1917, N. J.) 1oi
At. 281, 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 274. Cf. School District v. Livers (i8gg) 147
Mo. 580. See infra as to statutory provisions. Many cases contra are cited in
49 L R. A. (N. S.) ii66, note.
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citizen who sues on a contract between a water company and the
municipality. 37 It is not always easy to determine in fact whether or
not the plaintiff was contemplated by the parties as a beneficiary, and
much of the apparent conflict in decisions can be explained on this
ground. Where the beneficiary is a sole beneficiary, the difficulty
does not exist; but in the case of creditor-beneficiaries the question
may always be regarded as an open one. If the intention to create
a right in a third party is indicated with reasonable certainty, an action
by him should be maintainable even though the intention to benefit
him was only secondary and conditional, 8 and irrespective of whether
he is a donee or a creditor. Where the agreed performance involves
a payment direct to the third party, the enforcement of the contract
by him will carry out the intention of the parties.
LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES
Where a water company has contracted with a municipality to main-
tain a certain supply of water for the putting out of fires and has
failed to do so, with the result that the property of an individual
citizen has been destroyed, it is very generally held that the citizen
has no claim against the water company for breach of contracts'
Various reasons are given for these decisions. Sometimes they are
made to rest solely upon the lack of privity, without observing that
this is inconsistent with other cases in the same jurisdiction allowing
beneficiaries to maintain suit. In other cases it is asserted that the
contract was not made for the benefit of the citizens, an assertion that
would seem to be generally untrue in fact; and in others it is said
that the municipality had no legal power to make such a contract
for the benefit of its citizens, a statement that we may be permitted
to doubt as a matter of law. Most of the cases denying any right
to the citizen have done so for the reason formerly given by the New
York courts in all beneficiary cases, to the effect that no beneficiary
'Davis v. Clinton Water Co. (i88o) 54 Iowa, 59; Boston Safe D. & T. Co. v.
Salem W. Co. (1899) 94 Fed. 238. Contra: Gorrell v. Greensboro W. Co.(1899) i24 N. C. 328. See further Post, "Liability of Water Companies to
Third Persons."
" For this reason the decision in New Orleans St. J. Assn. v. Magnier, supra,
should be disapproved.
"'Ancrum v. Camden W. Co. (igog) 82 S. C. 284, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) io29,
64 S. E. 151; Hone v. Presque-Isle W. Co. (i9o8) io4 Me. 217. Contra, Wood-bury v. Tampa Waterworks (igog) 57 Fla. 243, 21 L. R A. (N. S.) i034. The
cases are very numerous. See Arthur L. Corbin, Liability of Water Companies(191o) 19 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 425, where the cases are collected and the possible
liability in tort is also considered. Individual citizens are very generally allowed
to sue transportation companies and other public service companies on contracts
made with the municipality. See note in 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1166.
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citizen who sues on a contract between a water company and the
municipality.57 It is not always easy to determine in fact whether or
not the plaintiff was contemplated by the parties as a beneficiary, and
much of the apparent conflict in decisions can be explained on this
ground. Where the beneficiary is a sole beneficiary, the difficulty
does not exist; but in the case of creditor-beneficiaries the question
may always be regarded as an open one. If the intention to create
a right in a third party is indicated with reasonable certainty, an action
by him should be maintainable even though the intention to benefit
him was only secondary and conditional,3s and irrespective of whether
he is a donee or a creditor. here the agreed perfor ance involves
a payment direct to the third party, the enforce ent of the contr t
by him will carry out the intention of the parties.
LIABILITY OF WATER CO PANIES
'¥here a water company has contracted with a unicipality to ain-
tain a certain supply of water for the putting out of :fires a has
failed to do so, with the result that the property of an individual
citizen has been destroyed, it is very generally held that the citizen
has no claim against the water company for breach of contract.It
Various reasons are given for these decisions. Sometimes they are
made to rest solely upon the lack of privity, without observing t at
this is inconsistent with other cases in the same jurisdiction allo ing
beneficiaries to maintain suit. In other cases it is asserted that the
contract was not made for the benefit of the citizens, an assertion that
would seem to be generally untrue in fact; and in others it is said
that the municipality had no legal power to make such a contract
for the benefit of its c~tizens, a statement that we may be per itted
to doubt as a matter of law. Most of the cases denying any right
to the citizen have done so for the reason formerly given by the e
York courts in all beneficiary cases, to the effect that no beneficiary
aT Davis v. Clinton Water Co. (1880) 54 Iowa, 59; Boston Safe D. & T. Co. v.
Salem W. Co. (1899) 94 Fed. 238. Contra: Gorrell v. Greensboro' . o.
(1899) 124 N. C. 328· See further post, "Liability of Water Companies to
Third Persons."
"For this reason the decision in New Orleans St. J. Assn. v. agnier, supra,
should be disapproved.
80 Ancrum v. Camden W. Co. (1909) 82 s. C. 284, 21 L R A. (N. S.) 1029,
64 S. E. 151; Hone v. Presque-Isle W. Co. (1908) 104 Me. 217. Contra, ood-
bury v. Tampa Waterworks (1909) 57 Fla. 243, 21 L. R A. (N. S.) 1034- The
cases are very numerous. See Arthur L. Corbin, Liability of Water Companies
(1910) 19 YALE LAW JOUIL'<AL, 425, where the cases are collected and the possible
liability in tort is also considered. Individual citizens are very generally allowed
to sue transportation companies and other public service companies on contracts





can sue unless the performance by the promisor will discharge some
legal or equitable duty of the promisee to the beneficiary. This reason
has already been shown to be unsound, as denying rights to all donee-
beneficiaries. Also it has been practically abandoned by the courts
of New York where it was invented. In all cases of this class the
rights of the citizen will vary with the words used by the parties in
the express contract; but if a water company contract is in fact for the
benefit of third persons they should have the same right of action that
other beneficiaries have.
CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL
The fact that the parties to a contract have executed a formal
instrument under seal should not affect the rule as to a third party
beneficiary's right to sue. If the right of a beneficiary is recognized
at all, it should be recognized in the case of contracts under seal, and
there is much authority to this effect.40  Many of the courts, however,
make the presence of a seal a reason for refusing to recognize a right
in the beneficiary.
4 1
THE BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT IS NOT BASED ON NOVATION
It has been held in a few cases that the third party beneficiary must
elect between his former debtor and the new promisor, and that a suit
against either one, even though it does not result in. collection, will
bar any action against the other.
4 2
The theory underlying these cases, though not expressed clearly,
seems to be that the agreement between the promisor and promisee
operates as an offer of a novation to the beneficiary. The chief objec-
tion to this theory is that in fact the parties contemplate no such offer
and the beneficiary has no reason to believe that in taking advantage
of the new contract he is extinguishing his previous rights. If such
an offer is in fact made and accepted, the case no longer falls under
the present heading. Where a novation is effected, there is a new
contract between the promisor and the new promisee, and the latter
'Bassett v. Hughes (1877) 53 Wis. 3x9; Hughes v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co.
(1884) 11 Ore. 437; Coster v. Albany (1871) 43 N. Y. 399; Pond v. New
Rochelle W. Co. (x9o6) 183 N. Y. 330; King v. Scott (i9g5) 76 W. Va. 58,
84 S. E. 954 (Code 1913, sec. 374o); Newberry Land Co. v. Newberry (1897)
95 Va. iig (Code i9o4, sec. 2415). See further 13 C. J. 711, sec. 818.
'Harms v. McCormick (i889) 132 Ill. io4; Hendrick v. Lindsey (1876) 93
U. S. 143; Willard v. Wood (I89) 135 U. S. 309; Crowell v. Hospital (1876)
27 N. J. Eq. 650.
1Bohanan v. Pope (i856) 42 Me. 93; Wood v. Moriarty (1887) 15 R. 1. 518;
Warren v. Batchelder (1845) i6 N. H. 58o. See also Aldrick v. Carpenter
(i893)-i6o Mass. i66.
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can sue unless the performance by the promisor wi l discharge some
legal or equitable duty of the promisee to the beneficiary. This reason
has already been shown to be unsound, as denying rights to all don e-
beneficiaries. Also it has been practically abandoned by the courts
of New York where it was invented. In a l cases of this cla s the
rights of the citizen will vary with the words used by the parties in
the express contract; but if a water company contract is in fact for the
benefit of third persons they should have the same right of action that
other beneficiaries have.
CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL
The fact that the parties to a contract have executed a for al
instrument under seal should ot ffect the rule as to a third arty
beneficiary's right to sue. If the right of a beneficiary is recognized
at all, it should be recognized in t e case of tracts under al, and
there is much authority to this effect.40 any f t e rts, ever,
make the presence of a seal a reason for f sing to recognize right
in the beneficiary.u
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27 . J. Eq. 650.
.. Bohanan 'lJ. Pope (1856) 42 e. 93; Wood 'lJ. oriarty (18 ) IS R. 1. 5
Warren 'lI. Batchelder (1845) 16 . H. 580. See also Aldrick 'U. Carpenter
(1893)-160 ass. 166.
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is not a beneficiary of a contract between other persons. Instead, he
is a prowmisee and he has given valuable consideration by discharging
his previous debtor.
In the absence of a novation, there seems to be no sufficient reason
for holding that the beneficiary's attempt to enforce the duty createdby the new contract amounts to a discharge of his previous rights
against the promisee. The history of the law of discharge at commonlaw justifies no such holding, and no sufficient reason appears forinducing equity to intervene and to discharge the promisee. In like
manner, a suit by the beneficiary against his formef debtor should not
affect his rights against the new promisor.
Where the beneficiary is not a creditor of the promisee he has no
rights to discharge, and the novation theory is wholly inapplicable.
Clearly also, the better authority appears to be that the creditor-
beneficiary's right against the new promisor is an additional
security. This carries out the real intention of the parties.
CHARACTER OF THE THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT
The right of a third party beneficiary should be described as a legal
right and as a contractual right. It is contractual because the opera-
tive facts creating it are acts of offer and acceptance; the party who
assumes the duty does so by consenting thereto, and the necessary
consideration is the same as that required for any contract. Uponbreach of the primary duty by the promisor, the secondary right of
the beneficiary may be a right to damages collectible in express
assumpsit; the beneficiary is not restricted to an action of debt orindebitatus assumpsit for the amount of the defendant's unjust
enrichment. Indeed, in most cases it is held that the promisor need
not have received anything at all; it is merely necessary that thepromisee shall have given consideration for the promise. There is
no particular reason therefore for describing the right and the duty
as quasi-contractual. We cannot properly say that the promisor and
the third party have made a contract, even though the third party has
assented; the contract was made by the promisor and the promisee.
The assent of the third party is certainly not the acceptance of an
offer, and the third party gives no consideration. Nevertheless, the
'Fischer v. Hope Mat. Life Ins. Co (1877) 69 N. Y. 161; Rodenbarger v.
Bramflett (x88I) 78 Ind. 213; Davis v. Hardy (I88I) 76 Ind. 272; Gay v.Blanchard (I88o) 32 La. Ann. 497, 5o5 ("True, there was no novation of thedebt There was simply an additional obligor bound for it."); Feldman v.McGuire (i89g) 34 Ore. 3o9; Smith v. Pfluger (19o5) 126 Wis. 253, 1O5 N. W.476. See also Poe v. Dixon (1899) 6o Oh. St i24.
This is necessarily true in mortgagee-beneficiary cases where the court basesthe mortgagees right against the grantee who has assumed the debt upon thedoctrine 6f subrogation. See Hopkins v. Warner (1895) io9 Cal. 133.
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is not a beneficiary of a contract between other persons. Instead, he
is a promisee and he has given valuable consideration by discharging
his previous debtor.
In the absence of a novation, there seems to be no sufficient reason
for holding that the beneficiary's attempt to enforce the duty created
by the new contract amounts to a discharge of his previous rights
against the promisee. The history of the law of discharge at common
law justifies no such holding, and no sufficient reason appears for
inducing equity to intervene and to discharge the promisee. In like
manner, a suit by the beneficiary against his former debtor should not
affect his rights against the new promisor.
Where the beneficiary is not a creditor of the promisee he has no
rights to discharge, and the novation theory is wholly inapplicable.
Oearly also, the better authority appears to be that the credit<;>r-
beneficiary's right against the new promisor is an additional
security.4a This carries out the real intention of the parties.
CHARACTER OF THE THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT
The right of a third party beneficiary should be described as a legal
right and as a contractual right. It is contractual because the opera-
tive facts creating it are acts of offer and acceptance; the party who
assumes the duty does so by consenting thereto, and the necessary
consideration is the same as that required for any contract. Upon
breach of the primary duty by the promisor, the secondary right of
the beneficiary may be a right to damages collectible in express
assumpsit; the beneficiary is not restricted to an action of debt or
indebitatus assumpsit for the amount of the defendant's unjust
enrichment. Indeed, in most cases it is held that the promisor need
not have received anything at all; it is merely necessary that the
promisee shall have given consideration for the promise. There is
no particular reason therefore for describing the right and the duty
as quasi-contractual. We cannot properly say that the promisor and
the third party have made a contract, even though the third party has
assented; the contract was made by the promisor and the promisee.
The assent of the third party is certainly not the acceptance of an
offer, and the third party gives no consideration. Nevertheless, the
Q Fischer v. Hope Mut. Life Ins. Co, (1877) 69 N. Y. 161; Rodenbarger v.
Bramjlett (1881) 78 Ind. 213; Davis v. Hardy (1881) 76 Ind. 272; Gay v.
Blanchard (1880) 32 La. Ann. 497, 50S ("True, there was no novation of the
debt. There was simply an additional obligor bound for it."); Feldman v.
McGuire (1899) 34 Ore. 309; Smith v. Pfluger (1905) 126 Wis. 253, 105 N. W.
476. See also Poe v. Dizon (1899) 60 Oh. St. 124-
This is necessarily true in mortgagee-beneficiary cases where the court bases
the mortgagee's right against the grantee who has assumed the debt upon the
doctrine cif subrogation. See Hopkins v. Warner (1895) 109 Cal. 133.
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right of this party and the duty of the promisor are properly described
as contractual.
There is no sufficient reason for describing the third party's right
as an equitable right instead of a legal one. The recognition of the
third party's right has very largely come about in jurisdictions where
there have never been separate courts of common law and of equity;
and even in other jurisdictions the right has been enforced in the
courts of law as well as in equity. Moreover, in fundamental
character, there is no difference between an equitable right and a legal
right. Any right, legal or equitable, implies a duty of performance
by another, the non-performance being penalized by society. Its
existence does not depend upon the number of officials or courts to
whom application must be made or upon the complexity of the
machinery of enforcement, although these may determine what the
secondary and other subsequent rights will be. The term equitable
has often meant in the past that application must be made to a
chancellor in a particular form called a "bill" and that the societal
penalty for nonperformance will be of a particular kind. It no longer
has that definite meaning; and if it has such a meaning it is inappli-
cable in this instance.
In the past, certain rights have been described as equitable because
there was a liability to their extinguishment for the benefit of some
innocent purchaser. Certain admittedly legal rights were likewise
subject to such a liability by the rules of market overt, and hence the
existence of such a liability is not the basis of a clear distinction.
The right of the third party beneficiary, however, is accompanied by
no liabilities that do not accompany all contract rights. The fact that
the promisee may have the power of extinguishment is not material
on this point. There is no chance here for the application of special
bona fide purchaser doctrines."4
The accuracy of the foregoing seems not to be doubted in the case
of a sole beneficiary. In the case of a creditor-beneficiary, however,
the contrary has been maintained, especially in cases where the court
overlooked altogether the rights of a sole beneficiary. Thus it has
been held that a mortgagee or other creditor cdn sue the promisor
only according to the procedure of a court of equity, and on the
theory that the promise is an "asset" of the promisee." Not only
"The relation between a beneficiary and the promisor is not a fiduciary one.
Attorney General v. American Legion of Honor (igio) 2o6 Mass. s58.
*Keller v. Ashford (1889) i33 U. S. 61o; Green v. Turner (i898) 8o Fed.
41, 86 Fed. 837; Hopkins v. Warner (1895) io9 Cal. 133; Forbes v. Thorpe
(191) 209 Mass. 570. Observe that this asset theory is different from the one
discussed previously. Here the promissory duty is the asset, and is to be
reached as an asset of the promisee. The other doctrine supposes the existence
of assets in the hands of the promisor. Forbes v. Thorpe, supra, might rest
upon both doctrines at once.
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is such a theory wholly inapplicable to sole beneficiaries, but it is
not the theory on which the rights of creditor-beneficiaries have
generally been based and it has not been consistently adhered to in
any state."' If the promisee has an "asset" in this case it should be
available like other assets to his other creditors as well as to the
particular creditor who is named as the payee. The present writer
has seen no creditor's bill for realizing on this asset brought by any
creditor other than the named payee; but if other creditors could
maintain such a bill, it would result in the payee's getting the whole
of this asset and still sharing other assets pro rata with the other
creditors as to any balance that might be due him. By differentiating
this particular creditor from other creditors and this particular "asset"
from other assets we are merely recognizing that he has obtained a
special right in personam as against the promisor, a right that is
created by a contract to which he was not a party. He gains this
special right because the contracting parties intended that he should
have it, or at least that the performance should go direct to him. To
apply the "equitable asset" theory is merely to recognize the third
party beneficiary's right under another and mis-descriptive name.
There is no doubt that the chancery procedure had many advantages
over that of the common law. This was especially true with respect
to its flexibility in the matter of parties to the suit, where more than
two parties were involved. In all beneficiary cases there are three
interested parties, although the interest of the promisee is not quite
the same in sole beneficiary cases as it is in creditor-beneficiary cases.
The rights and duties of the three can no doubt be better determined
and enforced in one suit to which all are parties than in two or more
suits in each of which only two are parties. If the promisor is sued
by either the promisee or the third party he should have the power
to make the other one a party to the suit No doubt the procedure of
nearly all of our courts is now such as to permit this. Even if not,
the case should be regarded merely as one where the promisor has
undertaken duties to two persons severally.
THE RIGHTS OF THE PROMISEE
It was once held in England that where a third party was sole
beneficiary, the promisee having no pecuniary interest in the per-
formance, the promisee could maintain no action at law.47 The same
," (i) Sole beneficiaries. Every state recognizes the right of a sole bene-
ficiary in some cases. (2) Statute of limitations. The mortgagee can sue the
mortgagor's grantee who assumes the debt, even though the statute of limita-
tions has barred the remedy against the mortgagor. Davis v. Davis (1912) 19
Cal. App. 797; Daniels v. Johnson (i9oo) 129 CaL 415. (3) Other defenses.
It is no defense to the promisor that the promisee may have had a good defense
against the plaintiff. Wsher v. Independent M. & D. Co. (i9o4) x42 Cal. 7o8
rLevet v. Hawes (1599) Cro. Erz 61g, 652.
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is such a theory wholly inapplicable to sole beneficiaries, but it is
not the theory on which the rights of creditor-beneficiaries have
generally been based a.."1d it has not been consistently adhere to in
any state.~e If the pro isee has an "asset" in this case it should be
available like other assets to his other creditors as ell as to the
particular creditor who is na ed as the payee. he present riter
has seen no creditor's bill for realizing on this asset brought b a
creditor other than the named payee; but if other creditors c l
maintain such a bill, it would result in the payee's getting the ho.le
of this asset and still sharing other assets pro rata ith the ot er
creditors as to any balance that might be due hi . y differentiating
this particular creditor from other creditors and this particular "asset"
from other assets we are merely recognizing that he has obtained a
special right in personam as against the pro isor, a right that is
created by a contract to which he as not a party. e gains t is
special right because the contracting parties intended that e s l
have it, or at least that the- performance should go direct to hi .
apply the "equitable asset" theory is erely to recognize the t ir
party beneficiary's right under another and is-descriptive .
There is no doubt that the chancery procedure had any advantages
over that of the common law. This was especially true ith res ect
to its flexibility in the matter of parties to the suit, here ore t a
two parties were involved. In all beneficiary cases there are t r
interested parties, although the interest of the pro isee is- not ite
the same in sole beneficiary cases as it is in creditor-beneficiary .
The rights and duties of the three can no doubt be etter t r i
and enforced in one suit to which all are parties than i t r r
suits in each of which only two are parties. If the pro isor is s
by either the promisee or the third party he should have the er
to make the other one a party to the suit o doubt the r ce re f
nearly all of our courts is now such as to per it this. ven if t,
the case should be regarded erely as one here the r is r s
undertaken duties to t o persons se erall .
THE RIGHTS F P ISEE
It was once held in England that here a third party as s l
beneficiary, the pro isee having ec iar i t rest i
formance, the promisee could aintain no action at la .41 e
.. (1) Sale beneficiaries. very state rec izes the right f t ene-
ficiary in some cases. (2) Statute of li itations. e rt ee can t e
mortgagor's grantee who assu es the debt, even though the st t te f li ita-
tions has barred the re edy against the ortgagor. vis 'lJ. i (1912)
Cat. App. 797; Daniels 'lJ. Johnson (1900) 129 a 415. (3) t r def .
It is no defense to the promisor that the pro isee ay have ad a good efense
against the plaintiff. asher'lJ. Independent : . . (1904) 142 at. 708.
Cf Le'lIet fl. Hawes (1599) ere. tiz. 619, 652-







has been held in some cases in the United States.'8 There seems to
be no sufficient reason for this. The promisee has paid the consid-
eration and the law should vindicate his right that performance shall
take place, even though the damage to the plaintiff is nominal. Where
the promisee has a pecuniary interest in performance, as where it
is to discharge a debt owed to the third party beneficiary, the promisee
certainly can sue the promisor in case of breach.'9 Thus the latter
may be sued by two persons on the same contract; but this is not
unjust, because his breach causes an injurious disappointment to
two separate persons. By availing himself of modem code procedure
or that of equity the promisor can avoid the expense of two actions
and the danger of a double recovery.
In states where the beneficiary cannot sue, of course the promisee
can, and he can recover the full amount promised1 The promisee's
right is assignable,51 and if the assignment is to the beneficiary the
latter can sue as assignee.5 2
POWER OF THE PROMISEE TO RELEASE THE PROMISOR
It is now clear that after the beneficiary has become aware of the
contract made for his benefit, and has either acted in reliance on it or
has in some manner expressed an assent and approval, the promisee
no longer has power to release the promisor from his duty to the
beneficiary.53 This is true whether the relation of the beneficiary to
the promisee is that of donee or that of creditor. No notice of his
'Ayers v. Dixon (879) 78 N. Y. 338; Adams v. Union Ry. (1899) 21 R I.
134; Reeves v. Bluff City Bank (i9oi) 63 Kan. 789; New Haven v. New Haven
& D. R. Co. (1892) 62 Conn. 252.
'Meyer v. Hartman (1874) 72 Ill. 442; Tinkler v. Swaynie (1880) 71 Ind.
562; Baldwin v. Emery (1897) 89 Me. 496; Merriam v. Lumber Co. (i877)
23 Minn. 314, 322; O'Neill v. American Legion of Honor (19o4) 70 N. J. L.
410; Langan v. American Legion of Honor (19o3) 174 N. Y. 266 (semble) ;
Kelly v. Security Co. (i9o6) i86 N. Y. 16. The last two cases suggest that the
propiisee is entitled to a decree for. specific performance. See further U. S.
Fidelity & G. Co. v. U. S. (1917) 246 Fed. 433.
"Furnas v. Durgin (1876) ii9 Mass. 5oo; Boardman v. Larrabee (1883) 51
Conn. 39.
The promisor can compel the promisee to pay over the sum collected to the
third party beneficiary if the latter holds a mortgage on the promisor's land.
Williams v. Fowle (1882) 132 Mass. 385 (semble); Furnas v. Durgin, supra,
(semble).
I Hyland v. Crofut (1913) 87 Conn. 49.
"Reed v. Paul (188i) 131 Mass. I29.
"Gifford v. Corrigan (889) II7 N. Y. 257; New York Ins. Co. v. Aitken
(i89i) 125 N. Y. 66o; Hill v. Hoeldtke (I1Q2) io4 Tex. 594, 142 S. W. 871;
4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, with note; Bassett v. Hughes (1877) 43 Wis. 319.
"The person who has made the stipulation cannot revoke it if the third party
has declared that he wished to take advantage of it." French Civil Code, sec.
I121. See also Civ. Code Cal. sec. 1559; Civ. Code S. Dak. sec. 1193; Rev. L.
Okla. 191o, sec. 895.
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has been held in some cases in the United States.'s There s ems to
be no sufficient reason for this. The promis e has paid the consid-
eration and the law should vindicate his right that performance shall
take place, even though the damage to the plaintiff is nominal. 'Where
the promisee has a pecuniary interest in performance, as where it
is to discharge a debt owed to the third party beneficiary, the promis e
certainly can sue the promisor in case of breach.'l1 Thus the la ter
may be sued by two persons on the same contract; but this is not
unjust, because his breach causes an injurious disa pointment to
two separate persons. By availing himself of modem code procedure
or that of equity the promisor can avoid the expense of two actions
and the danger of a double recovery.
In states where the beneficiary cannot sue, of course the promis e
can, and he can recover the full a ount promised.50 The promis e's
right is assignable, 1 and if the assignment is to the beneficiary the
latter can sue as assignee.5 :
POWER OF THE PROMISEE TO ELE SE THE PROMISOR
It is now clear that after the e eficiary has eco e are f the
contract made for his benefit, and as ither ted in reliance on it r
has in some manner expressed a asse t d r al, r isee
no longer has power to release the r isor fr is t
beneficiary.53 This is true hether t e r lation f t fi iary
the promisee is that of donee r t at f r it r. is
.. Ayers . 1879) . 1 ; s . i y. (1899) 21 R. I.
134; Reeves v. Bluff City Bank (1901) 63 a . ; .
& D. R. Co. (ISgz) 62 Conn. 252.
.. Meyer v. Hartman (1874) 72 IlL 442; inkler . i 0)
562; Baldwin v. Emery (1897) 89 e. 496; erria . . 1 )
23 Minn. 314, 322 ; 'Neill v. erican i r 0 )
410; Langan v. America,~ Legion of Honor (1903) . . le)
Kelly v. Security Co. (1906) 186 N. Y. 16. he last t s s t
promisee is entitled to a decree for. specific perfor ance.
Fidelity & G. Co. v. U. S. (1917) 246 Fed. 433.
.. Furnas v. Durgin (1876) 119 ass. 00; rd an . rrabee )
Conn. 39.
The promisor can compel the pro isee to pay r t s coll t
third party beneficiary if the latter holds a ort a e o t r i l
Williams v. Fowle (1882) 132 ass. 385 (s le); rnas v. urgin, supra,
(semble).
11 Hyland v. Crofut (1913) 87 Conn. 49.
.. Reed v. Paul (1881) 131 ass. 129-
"Gifford v. Corrigan (1889) 117 . . 257; Yor Ins. o. v. itke71-
(1891) 125 N. Y. 660; Hill v. Hoeldtke (1912) 104 Tex:. 594. 142 S. . 87 ;
-40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, with note; Bassett v. ughes (187 ) 43 is. 319.
"The person who has made the stipulation cannot revoke it if the third party
has declared that he wished to take advantage of it." Frenc Civil Code, sec.
1121. See also Civ. Code CaL sec. 1559; Civ. Code S. Dak. sec. II93; Rev. L









assent by the beneficiary to the promisor is necessary."4 Prior to
assent by the beneficiary the promisee may perhaps have the power
to release."5  Where the third party is the sole beneficiary of the con-
tract the promisee is generally held to have no power whatever to
release the promisor, even before the third party is aware of the
contract5 8
DEFENSES OF THE PROMISOR AS AGAINST THE BENEFICIAMY
The beneficiary's rights against the promisor spring from the con-
tract as it was made, and if that contract was in the beginning void
for lack of any essential element the third party has no rights. So
likewise if the contract was voidable for infancy or insanity or fraud,
it is voidable as against the beneficiary.57 If the duty of the promisor
is subject to some condition precedent, the correlative right of the
beneficiary is likewise conditional.58
On the other hand, just as- soon as the right of the beneficiary is in
existence and beyond the power of the promisee to destroy by a
release or rescission, it is also beyond his power to destroy by wrong-
ful acts that would discharge the promisor's duty to himself. Thus a
beneficiary can still hold a surety on his bond even though the
promisee has discharged such surety's duty to himself by surrendering
collateral securities5" or by making an alteration of the contract with
the principal and without the surety's consent8 0°
"Hill v. Hoeldtke, supra.
ITrimble v. Strother (874) 25 Oh. -St 378; Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v.
Hutchings (1884) oo Ind. 496; Commercial N. B. v. Kirkwood (1898) 172 Ill.
563; Gilbert v. Sanderson (I88) 56 Iowa, 349.
" Tweeddale v. Tweeddale (19o3) 116 Wis. 517; Wetutzke v. Wetutzke
(1914) [58 Wis. 3o5, 148 N. W. io88. The right of the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy is generally held to be irrevocable by the insured, even prior
to any knowledge or assent by the beneficiary, unless the power of revocation
is reserved in the policy. Such a power may of course be reserved.
"Arnold v. Nichols (1876) 64 N. Y. 117 (the usual rules as to rescission for
fraud concerning the return of the consideration, etc., apply) ; Jenness v. Simp-
son (i91o) 84 Vt. 127, 139; Cohrt v. Koch (i88i) 56 Iowa, 658; Crowe v.
Lewin (1884) 95 N. Y. 423; Dunning v. Leavitt (i88i) 85 N. Y. 30; Green v.
Turner (1898) 8o Fed. 41, 86 Fed. 837.
'Jenness v. Simpson (i91o) 84 Vt .127, 143; Osborne v. Cabell (1883) 77
Va. 462 (nonperformance or failure of consideration). The case of O'Rourke
v. John Hancock M. L. L Co. (19o2) 23 R. I. 457, is in effect contra, and cannot
be supported.
The power of rescission or alteration may be reserved in express terms.
"Doll v. Crume (1894) 41 Neb. 655; School District v. Livers (i899) 147 Mo.
58o.
"Equitable Sur. Co. v. McMillan (1913) 234 U. S. 448; United States v.
National Sur. Co. (i899) 92 Fed. 549; Victoria Lumber Co. v. Wells (1916)
139 La. Soo; Cowles v. U. S. Fidelity, etc. Co. (i9o3) 32 Wash. i2o; Conn. v.
State (189o) 125 Ind. 514; Steffes v. Lemke (i889) 40 Minn. 27.
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
The duty of the promisor to the beneficiary is quite independent of
previous or subsequent relations between the promisee and the benefi-
ciary.8 '
MASSACHUSETTS LAW
Prior to 1850 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held in a
number of cases that a beneficiary could sue on a contract made by
others. 2  It was largely upon these cases that the decision in
Lawrence v. Fox' was based, and they have had an important
influence upon the law in the United States to-day. In Mellen v.
Whipple" it was held that a mortgagee could not sue the grantee of
the mortgagor although he had assumed the debt, and Judge Metcalf
put all the earlier cases into three classes which he declared to be
exceptions to the general rule that no action lies by one not a promisee.
Two of these classes were, first, cases where the defendant had
received assets which he ought to pay over and, second, cases where
the beneficiary was related by blood to the promisee. In Putnam v.
Field"5 a liberal application was made of the assets exception. In
Exchange Bank v. Rice"8 a creditor-beneficiary was not allowed to
sue, Judge Gray referring to the three classes of exceptions with no
very marked approval. Somewhat later all of Judge Metcalf's classes
of exceptions seem to have been disapproved, and the cases on which
they were based have been declared to be overruled. In Marston v.
Bigelow 67 it was held that a sole beneficiary who was the son of the
promisee could not enforce the contract in either law or equity; and
in Borden v. Boardman8 the assets exception was disregarded and it
was held that the beneficiary could not sue unless the parties had
' The fraud of the plaintiff as against the promisee is not available as a
defense to the promisor. Hurst v. Knight (1914, Tex.) 164 S. W. Io7z. The
grantee of the mortgagor who has assumed the mortgage debt can set up no
defenses against the mortgagee except a satisfaction. Washer v. Independent M.
& D. Co. (i9o4) z42 Cal. 702, 7o8; Davis v. Davis (1922) ig Cal. App. 797
(statute of limitations) ; Daniels v. Johnson (igoo) 129 Cal. 415 (same).
"Felton v. Dickinson (813) io Mass. 287 (sole beneficiary and blood rela-
tion) ; Arnold v. Lyman (282I) 17 Mass. 400; Hall v. Marston (1822) 17 Mass.
575; Fitch v. Chandler (1849) 4 Cush. 254; Brewer v. Dyer (i85i) 7 Gush.
337 ("the law, operating on the act of the parties, creates the duty, establishes
the privity, and implies the promise and obligation").
(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
(854) I Gray, 317. See also Dow v. Clark (1856, Mass.) 7 Gray, 198.
(1870) 1O3 Mass. 556.
(1871) 107 Mass. 37. But see Nash" v. Commonwealth (899) 174 Mass. 335,
where the exceptions laid down in Mellen v. Whipple seem to be approved.
' (i889) 1SO Mass. 45. But see Dean v. American Legion of Honor (892)
i56 Mass. 435, 438; Attorney Gen. v. American Legion of Honor (igio) 2o6
Mass. 158, i66.
" (1892) 157 Mass. 410. A right in the plaintiff in this sort of case has since
been recognized as enforceable by a bill in equity. Forbes v. Thorpe (i911)
69
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created a trust. Had the magic word "trust" been used, it is clear
that the beneficiary's action in "contract" would have been sustained.
Thus the Massachusetts law is supposed to have been brought into
harmony with that of England. There is some reason to believe,
however, that the Massachusetts court is not wholly satisfied, and
numerous decisions very materially limit the rule. In several cases
the court has established the existence of "privity" by the liberal use
of fiction. Thus where the defendant promised an expectant father
to pay a sum of money to the yet unborn child in return for the
father's giving the child a certain name it was held that the child
could maintain suit on the contract.6 9 In some curious fashion the
court was able to convince itself that the child was the promisee and
also gave part of the consideration. The child was really a sole (and
donee) beneficiary. In like manner an artificial privity in favor of a
creditor-beneficiary was discovered by the court in a case where the
licensee of a patent had agreed to pay a royalty and had later assigned
his license to the defendant "subject to covenants." The licensor
was given judgment against the assignee for the royalty due.7 0
Again, where an insurance policy was issued to a mortgagor but the
loss was payable to the mortgagee "as its interest may appear," it
was held that the mortgagee could sue on the policy in its own name.71
In a later case,72 the question was raised whether the mortgagee here
sued as a- promisee or as an assignee; but so far as appears, the
plaintiff was a creditor-beneficiary. 3 Much earlier, the court had
held that a mortgagee-beneficiary could sue the promisor if he held
an assignment from the promisee.74
2o9 Mass. 57o. And in other cases a trust was held to be created by reason of
a statute that bears no obvious indication of any such intent. See Nash v.
Commonwealth (i899) 174 Mass. 335; George H. Sampson Co. v. Common-
wealth (igog) 2o2 Mass. 326.
1Gardner v. Denison (1914) 217 Mass. 492; Eaton v. Libbey (1896) 165
Mass. 218.
"Paper Stock D. Co. v. Boston D. Co. (i888) 147 Mass. 318. In this case
the licensee had an express power to assign; but this is not the power of an
agent, much less is it the power to effect a novation.
'Palmer Say. Bank v. Insurance Co. (896) I66 Mass. 189. Even if the
plaintiff was in fact the promisee, which seems unlikely, it gave no tonsidera-
tion; and in the English courts this fact would deprive the plaintiff of a right
to sue. Dunlop v. Selfridge figS] A. C. 847. No doubt this Massachusetts
decision was influenced by R. L. i902, c. 1i8, sec. 58; but that statute does not
purport to confer a right of action upon a third party beneficiary. To the same
effect is Union Inst. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (19o7) i96 Mass. 23o, where the
mortgagor is declared to be the mortgagee's agent
" Attleborough Bank v. Security Ins. Co. ('897) 168 Mass. -47, 149.
" The Michigan courts regard the mortgagee as a mere third party beneficiary,
and deny him a remedy. Minnock v. Eureka Ins. Co. (1892) 9o Mich. 236;
Hartford F. I Co. v. Davenport (i877) 37 Mich. 609.
"Reed v. Paul (i881) i31 Mass. i29.
io26
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
In a recent case the court has held that a creditor-beneficiary has
an equitable claim against the promisor on the theory that the duty
of the promisor to the promisee is an asset of the latter that is
available to his creditor. 5 In another case, where A promised B
"as trustee" to pay a sum of money to C, it was held that B could
recover substantial damages and would hold them in trust for C. It
is to be observed that the promise of A was not to pay the money
to B, in trust for C, but was to pay the money directly to C.76
Another method of creating a right in a creditor-beneficiary is to
describe the defendant's failure to perform his contract as a tort."
This method would be used only in cases where the defendant's con-
duct falls naturally within the tort field, and very likely the other
existing facts would be held to create a tort liability in the absence of
any contract whatever.
The foregoing cases indicate that the Massachusetts court is quite
willing to enforce a duty in the absence of privity in favor of certain
kinds of beneficiaries. It may be admitted that this tendency is as
yet illustrated only in decisions that are based upon a liberal use of
fiction or upon specious distinctions. This is the traditional manner
in which a conservative court abandons a previously asserted general
rule.T
NEW YORK LAW
The law in New York has already been sufficiently indicated in dis-
cussing the rules prevailing throughout the whole country, for the
New York courts have had a decisive influence on those prevailing
rules. In one respect, however, these courts have been following a
course similar to that indicated in Massachusetts. In a number of
cases it was laid down that the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox7' was to
be restricted to cases exactly parallel thereto, thus allowing creditor-
"Forbes v. Thorpe (1911) 2o9 Mass. 570. See also Clare v. Hatch (i9o2Y
i8o Mass. x94. Observe that the existence of this "asset" makes the promisor
a debtor and not a trustee. The same is true where a devisee accepts a devise
on condition of payment of a legacy to a third party. Felch v. Taylor (1832)
r3 Pick. 133; Adams v. Adams (1867) 14 Allen, 65. See discussion of this
"asset" theory supra.
76 Grime v. Borden (1896) x66 Mass. 198.
T'Phinney v. Boston El. Co. (i9o9) 2o Mass. 286.
"The contract with the city, whereby the defendant undertook to relieve the
city of the performance of its statutory duty, brought, the defendant into a
relation to those travellers which was the foundation of a legal obligation to
provide for their safety."
"' By statute the beneficiary of a life insurance policy can sue thereon in his
own name. St. 1894, C. 225. See also Dean v. American Legion of Honor
(,892) 156 Mass. 435; Attorney Gen. v. American Legion of Honor (igio) 206
Mass. i58 ("on a broad construction of the statutes").
"(1859) 2o N. Y. 268
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beneficiaries to sue and shutting out sole or donee-beneficiaries. The
existence of the relation of debtor and creditor between the promisee
and the third party was required, or at least the former must owe the
latter some "legal or equitable duty" which will be discharged by the
promisor's performance.80 The New York courts are rapidly destroy-
ing this very unsatisfactory limitation, but are doing it by greatly
expanding the content of the term "legal or equitable duty." Thus,
the general duty that a husband owes to his wife to care for and sup-
port her is sufficient to enable her to sue on a promise (made to the
husband) to pay her $5o,ooo.81 An aunt owes a sufficient duty to her
favorite niece when the latter has lived in the aunt's house free of
charge and has loved her aunt. 2 A resident of a municipality can
sue on a contract made between it and the defendant for the benefit
of the inhabitants even though the resident could not have sued the
municipality in this particular case, inasmuch as the municipality
owes some sort of duty to conserve the interests of the inhabitants.3
On the same principle, the duty that a labor union owes to its mem-
bers who pay dues is sufficient to sustain an action by a member as
beneficiary."
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Some states provide by statute that one for whose benefit a promise
is made may maintain an action upon the promise." Third parties
'Durnherr v. Ras (1892) 135 N. Y. 219; Vrooman v. Turner (877) 69
N. Y. 28o; Lorrillard v. Clyde (xi8o) i= N. Y. 498. Todd v. Weber (1884) 95
N. Y. i81 is directly contra.
'Buchanan v. Tilden (x899) x58 N. Y. iog; Bouton v. Welch (i9o2) 27o
N. Y. 554. See also DeCicco v. SchweLser (1g17, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7. It may
be observed that the payment by the promisor will not discharge the duty of
the husband to support his wife.
:Seaver v. Ransom (1917, App. Div.) i68 N. Y. Supp. 454.
Little v. Banks (-.88x) 85 N. Y. 258; Pond v. New Rochelle W. Co. (x9o6)
183 N. Y. 33o; Smyth v. New York (i92i) 203 N. Y. xo6; Rigney v. New York,
etc. R. Co. (i9x6) 217 N. Y. 3; Schnaier v. Bradley Cont. Co., decided Feb.
x, i9x, in N. Y. App. Div. See also City of St. Louis v. Von Phul (1895)
z33 Mo. 561.
Gula v. Barton (1924, N. Y.) x64 App. Div. 293.
"A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be
enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." Cal. Civ.
Code, § x559;.Idaho Civ. Code, § 2728; Mont. Civ. Code, § 2103; N. Dak. Rev.
Codes, § 5285; S. Dak. Civ. Code, § 4688.
"If a covenant or promise be made for the sole benefit of a person with whom
it is not made, such person may maintain in his own name, any action thereon
which he might maintain in case it had been made with him only, and the con-
sideration had moved from him to the party making such covenant or promise."
Va. Code, § 24x5; W. Va. Code, ch. 71, § 2.
"If there be a valid consideration for the promise, it matters not from whom
it is moved; the promisee may sustain his action, though a stranger to the con-
sideration." Georgia Code (1911) § 4249.
"Any person or persons for whose benefit any contract shall have been made
or may hereafter be made, whether such contract be under seal or not, may
maintain an action thereon in any court of law or equity and may use the same
1028
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CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
can everywhere maintain suit upon statutory official bonds that have
been required by law for their protection. 8 Likewise there are
statutes providing that contractors engaged on public works shall give
a bond to secure performance and also to protect material men and
laborers, a suit by such third persons being expressly or impliedly
authorized.87
Most states having the reformed procedure provide that all actions
shall be brought in the name of the real party in interest. It has
been inferred that this provision "places the matter beyond all doubt,
for the person for whose benefit the promise is made is certainly the
real party in interest."88  In fact, however, this statutory provision
does not affect the problem. It was adopted merely for the purpose
of creating a more direct and satisfactory procedure for the enforce-
ment of rights already recognized as existing by either law or equity
(or by some other system of courts). The question to be determined
here is what is the legal operation of the facts of offer and acceptance
between promisor and promisee with respect to a third party benefi-
ciary. Do they create in such third party any legal or equitable
right? Until we answer this question in the affirmative, it can hardly
be said that the beneficiary is "the real party in interest" as that term
is used in the procedural statute. And after we have answered it in
the affirmative, the beneficiary does not need the aid of this statute
to sue in his own name.
as matter of defense to any action brought or to be brought against such
person or persons, notwithstanding the consideration of such contract did not
move from such person or persons." New Jersey Law igaa, c. 251.
See also French Civil Code, sec. 2. The Louisiana Code is similar to the
French. See New Orleans St. I. Assn. v. Magnier (1861) 16 La. Ann. 338;
Gay v. Blanchard (i88o) 32 La. Ann. 497.
England and Massachusetts have statutes enabling the beneficiary of an
insurance policy to sue. Mass. St. 1894, c. 25. In Michigan and Connecticut
there are similar statutes in favor of mortgagee-beneficiaries. Mich. Comp.
Laws 1897, sec. 519; Conn. G. S. i9o2, sec. 587.
" Such bonds are distinguished in Jefferson v. Asch (1893) 53 Minn. 446.
Coster v. Albany (1871) 43 N. Y. 399, 412 (semble).
'See the Federal statutes, 30 St. at L 9o6, c. 218; 33 St at L 8ri, c. 778.
Mass. R. L igo2, c. 6, sec. 77; Mass. St. igo9, c. 514, sec. 23. Equitable Sur.
Co. V. McMillan (19x3) 234 U. S. 448. Many cases of this sort are cited in
note, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175-,197.
"Pomeroy, Rein. and Rem. Rights, § 139; Stevens v. Flannagan (r891) 13r
Ind. 122; Ellis v. Harrison (x89r) 104 Mo. 270.
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